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ABSTRACT: In an e⁄ort to meet its obligations under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, in 2005 the European Union introduced a cap-and-trade scheme where
mandated installations are allocated permits to emit CO2. Financial markets
have developed that allow companies to trade these carbon permits. For the
EU to achieve reductions in CO2 emissions at a minimum cost, it is necessary
that companies make appropriate investments and policymakers design optimal
policies. In an e⁄ort to clarify the workings of the carbon market, several recent
papers have attempted to statistically model it. However, the European carbon
market (EU ETS) has many institutional features that potentially impact on
daily carbon prices (and associated ￿nancial futures). As a consequence, the
carbon market has properties that are quite di⁄erent from conventional ￿nan-
cial assets traded in mature markets. In this paper, we use dynamic model
averaging (DMA) in order to forecast in this newly-developing market. DMA
is a recently-developed statistical method which has three advantages over con-
ventional approaches. First, it allows the coe¢ cients on the predictors in a
forecasting model to change over time. Second, it allows for the entire fore-
casting model to change over time. Third, it surmounts statistical problems
which arise from the large number of potential predictors that can explain car-
bon prices. Our empirical results indicate that there are both important policy
and statistical bene￿ts with our approach. Statistically, we present strong evi-
dence that there is substantial turbulence and change in the EU ETS market,
and that DMA can model these features and forecast accurately compared to
conventional approaches. From a policy perspective, we discuss the relative and
changing role of di⁄erent price drivers in the EU ETS. Finally, we document
the forecast performance of DMA and discuss how this relates to the e¢ ciency
and maturity of this market.
Keywords: Bayesian, carbon permit trading, ￿nancial markets, state space
model, model averaging
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11 Introduction
The largest carbon market in the world, the European Union Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) commenced operation on January 1st, 2005. It is the key institution
whereby EU countries aim to meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
Currently, over 11,000 energy-intensive installations in the power industry and
￿ve major industrial sectors (including oil, iron and steel, cement, glass, and
pulp and paper) are included in the scheme. Together these account for nearly
half of Europe￿ s total CO2 emissions. The scheme caps CO2 emissions, and
then distributes allowances to emit to large energy users. One EU allowance
(EUA) is equal to one metric tonne of CO2. This "right to pollute" permit is
a tradeable commodity. Thus, the supply of permits is set by the cap, and the
demand for permits depends on the level of CO2 emissions in a given year. In
2009, the total value of the market had grown to e103 billion by the end of the
year, with 8.7 billion tonnes of C02 traded, accounting for over 95% of the total
value of carbon traded worldwide (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010).
The ultimate goal of the EU ETS is to ￿nance investment in a low carbon
economy. According to analysts, if this is to be met, the price of carbon must
rise substantially to at least e40 per tonne. However, the all-time high was
achieved in 2006, when prices reached just over e30 a tonne, but usually it
has been much lower than this. Compounding the problem of low prices is their
volatility. When trading began in 2005, the price of a permit on the spot market
was around e5. It rose quickly to between e20 and e30 and then crashed on the
announcement that 2005 allocations had been overestimated. Prices rebounded
again to e15 before falling to under e1 in February 2007 and to less than a cent
in August 2007. Prices for 2008-12 allowances began trading at over e20, before
falling throughout the latter half of 2008. The market regained some ground in
2009 and, since the middle of 2009 has been ￿ uctuating between e12 and e16.
Like any commodity market, certain fundamentals (often referred to as
￿price drivers￿ ) will be expected to play a role in explaining changes in the
carbon price. But the exact list of price drivers and the magnitude of their
a⁄ects on price is unclear. Moreover, unlike other commodity markets, the Eu-
ropean carbon market is fundamentally determined by compliance. The supply
of permits is set by the European Commission (EC), which also controls the
allocation, bankability and size of the program through the number of partici-
pants and permits. These elements of the trading scheme have di⁄ered between
the ￿rst (2005-2007) and the second trading phase (2008-2012). They will also
change again, in the third phase (2013-2020), as the cap tightens and the size of
the market increases with the extension to more polluters. Uncertainty over a
global climate agreement, the size of the future cap and market, the eligibility
and number of some types of o⁄sets allowable in the scheme are key factors
impacting on the price of carbon now and in the future. While all commodities
markets face uncertainties, the changing conditions of imposed by compliance
are unique to the EU ETS.
Because of the changing complexities of this commodity market, measuring
price drivers and forecasting prices raises particular challenges for the statis-
2tician seeking to understand the dynamics of this new and evolving market.
As with many ￿nancial studies (e.g. Avramov 2002), the number of potential
variables that may a⁄ect prices is large. This can lead to over-parameterization
problems (i.e. regression techniques may apparently ￿t well in-sample, but this
may be due to over-￿tting, leading to poor forecast performance). In response
to this problem, it is increasingly common to use Bayesian model averaging in
such cases (see e.g. Avramov, 2002, Ley and Steel, 2009 and 2010 and the ref-
erences cited therein). Moreover, the marginal e⁄ects of predictors can change
over time, i.e. parameters can change or structural breaks can occur. Also, the
relevant forecasting model may change. These types of changes are especially
likely to occur in a market such as the EU ETS, where there are many potential
macroeconomic, ￿nancial and institutional variables, the impacts of which will
vary both within and between phases, with implications for the price of carbon.
To address these issues, we use an approach called Dynamic Model Averaging
(DMA). DMA can handle the over-￿tting problems caused by the presence of
many predictors and allows for both parameter and model change and, thus,
seems ideal for forecasting the carbon markets.
We forecast spot and future prices of carbon permits traded between April
2005 and August 2010 using a set of large set of potential predictors which
combines those used in a variety of other studies. We ￿nd that DMA forecasts
of carbon prices in the EU ETS are much better than conventional forecasts.
Furthermore, DMA gives insight into the range and changing role of various
factors driving carbon prices in the di⁄erent phases of the EU ETS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an
overview of the EU ETS market since 2005, its main institutional aspects and
price drivers. It includes an overview of the empirical literature on carbon
trading as it relates to the EU ETS. This section also motivates the choice of
variables used in the analysis. Section 3 discusses de￿nitional and other issues
relating to the data set. Section 4 presents the DMA methodology. Section 5
presents the paper￿ s results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Carbon Prices in the EU ETS
2.1 Institutional and Policy Aspects
In contrast to the command-and-control approach to pollution control, which
sets and then regulates limits on emissions, the EU ETS uses a market-based
approach.3 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has agreed to cut emissions by
8% relative to 1990 levels by the years 2008-12. This may rise to as much as
30% cuts relative to 1990 levels by the end of 2020. Under the EU ETS scheme,
large emitters subject to compliance are allocated an annual number of permits.
Each permit grants the right to emit one tonne of CO2. Permits can be bought
and sold in ￿nancial markets. An installation that exceeds its cap can purchase
3More detailed information on the EU ETS can be found at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm
3additional permits on the market. An installation that has more permits than
emissions can sell its excess permits or bank them for a limited period. At
the end of each year, companies must surrender a number of permits equal to
the amount of their total emissions for the year.4 Each year the EC, the body
responsible for regulating the scheme, discloses information on compliance and
veri￿ed emissions for each installation and at the country level.5 Emissions and
compliance information on all member states￿installations under the scheme
is contained in the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL), which is
publicly available and updated each year.6
Emission allowances are allocated to installations for a number of phases,
known as trading periods. The scheme has three trading periods, de￿ned by
their di⁄erent compliance requirements. The ￿rst trading period (Phase 1) ran
from 2005-2007. During this phase, nearly 2.2 billion permits of 1 tonne each
were allocated each year. Approximately 60% of these were allocated to the
power sector. Allocation is based on each member state￿ s National Allocation
Plan (NAP), which in turn is based on its Kyoto commitment. The NAPs were
used to decide how many allowances are allocated and to which installations.
NAPs have been criticized for leading members to misrepresent their emissions,
leading to an overallocation of permits. As a consequence, caps were tightened
for Phase 2 (2008-2012), which are 6.5% lower than in Phase 1. The vast
majority of permits have been allocated freely to installations, based on their
historical emissions.7 Member states were permitted to auction up to 5% of
allowances in Phase 1 and 10% in Phase 2. Limitations on the auctioning of
permits have been criticized for suppressing carbon prices and creating windfall
pro￿ts for installations.8
In order to provide ￿ exibility for installations, the scheme allows for in-
tertemporal borrowing and banking of permits within each phase. That is,
￿rms can borrow on next year￿ s permits to ￿ll a shortage in the current year or
bank permits for upcoming years. Inter-phase borrowing and banking was not
4However, they are not required to hold the number of permits during the year; a set-up
that raises the possibility of liquidity problems if installations ￿nd that they are suddenly
short of permits when it it is time to surrender them.
5Speci￿cally, the calendar of compliance is as follows: On February 28th of each year
installations receive their new allocation for the upcoming commitment year. March 31 is
the deadline for the submission of a veri￿ed emissions report. April 30th of each year is the
deadline for surrender of permits used in the previous year. May 15 is the deadline for the
report by the European Commission of veri￿ed emissions for all installations covered by the
EU-ETS.
6The CITL can be viewed at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/.
7There is also a requirement that new entrants receive a reserve of free allocations while
allocations from entities that have shut-down cannot be re-sold. Ellerman and Buchner (2008)
discusses the implications of these institutional features and ￿nds their impacts on prices to
be ambiguous.
8As a consequence, critics argue for the auctioning of permits as a way of e¢ ciently allo-
cating permits and ensuring a higher price. Auctioning also provides other bene￿ts, including
fewer tax distortions, greater incentives for businesses to make investments in low-carbon tech-
nologies, and the reduction of political manipulation in the allocation of permits (Cramton
and Kerr 2002; Bohringer and Lange 2005).
4allowable in Phase 1 or Phase 2. However, allowances distributed during Phase
2 can be banked for future use in Phase 3. Banking/borrowing provisions may
have an impact on the carbon price. Banking may help installations hoping to
hedge risks against seasonal and cyclical price swings. However, on the other
hand, interperiod restrictions may severely a⁄ect the price of carbon. Alberola
and Chevallier (2009b), for example, demonstrate how the restriction in banking
and borrowing between Phase 1 and Phase 2 was responsible for dramatic price
falls observed in 2007.
One notable feature of Phase 2 has been the introduction of carbon o⁄sets.
As an alternative to obtaining EU ETS carbon permits, a ￿rm may o⁄set some of
its carbon emissions by investing in emission reductions elsewhere in the world.
The mechanism for doing so was set up through EU￿ s Directive 2004/101/EC
(The Linking Directive), which links the EU ETS with project mechanisms
under the Kyoto Protocol.9 Under this directive, ￿rms can purchase a limited
number of carbon o⁄sets called CERs (certi￿ed emission reductions) and ERUs
(emission reduction units) in order to meet their obligations.
The fundamental economic rationale of this scheme is that countries di⁄er
in their marginal costs of abatement. Poorer countries, in particular, will tend
to have lower marginal abatement costs than industrialized countries of the
EU. Hence these mechanisms help to achieve a given emission reduction target
at a lower cost than possible at home. In 2008, CERs accounted for 3.9% of
all surrendered permits, the overwhelming number of these originating from
projects in China and India. ERUs accounted for only 0.002% of surrendered
permits. Thus, in Phase 2, carbon o⁄sets accounted for a small, but important
part of the EU carbon market. Trading in CERs began in earnest in 2008
while ERUs only recently started trading in the latter half of 2010. In Phase 2,
installations have been able to buy international credits equivalent to 1.4 billon
tonnes CO2 or a yearly average of 280 million tonnes per year. In Phase 3, rules
on the use of credits is still undecided but installations will be able to carry over
unused credits from Phase 2 and an undetermined number of additional o⁄sets.
In any event, the use of o⁄sets will be limited to no more than 50% of the EU
emissions reductions to be made between 2008-2020 and after 2013 only o⁄sets
from countries that have approved an international climate agreement or new
types of EC approved projects will be permissible.
The CER market itself has many interesting institutional features. CER
prices opened in the ￿rst months of January 2008 at over e20, with prices
falling to below e10 on both the spot and futures markets in February 2009.
Overall, prices have averaged around e13 since trading began. Despite this
relative stability, project ￿nancing for CERs has diminished, falling over 50%
between 2009 and 2010. A signi￿cant event a⁄ecting the price of CERs was
the announcement by the Hungarian government on March 11, 2010 that it
9These mechanisms are called the Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows for investment in projects that reduce or o⁄set emissions
in developing countries; while the JI is limited to projects in countries that have agreed to
cuts under Kyoto, i.e. industrialized and transitional market economies. CERs are generated
by the CDM and ERUs by the JI.
5had sold nearly 2 million CERs which had been surrendered for compliance
to its national register. Surrendered permits are automatically retired in the
EU ETS, but similar rules were not in place for CERs. Hence there was nothing
stopping the Hungarian government from selling the CER permits it was holding
back on the market. The news that recycled permits were circulating on the
international market led to a fall in the price of CERs.
Another problem to hit the CER market centred on the questionability of
its projects. The vast majority of CDM investments have been in China and
involve the destruction of hydro￿ ourocarbons (HFCs) and nitrous oxides, which
are potent global warming gases. They accounted for about a half of the 430
million CERs issued up to 2010 (Point Carbon 2010), helping to create a certain
price stability for CERs. When news emerged that many projects had involved
expanding production of HFCs simply to gain CERs by shutting them down
again, prices fell by nearly 2%. The CDM executive responded by delaying the
issuance of CERs from such projects, a move that increased CER prices. As a
consequence of these problems, from 2013, o⁄set credits from certain HFCs and
nitrous oxides will likely be banned.10
Fraudulent activity has also emerged in the EU ETS itself. It came to light
in the beginning of 2009, when high volumes of trade were noted on France￿ s
Bluenext exchange. Trading reached a record 19.8 million permits on 2 June,
2009, having exceeded the previous record of 15.1 million tons on 29 May, 2009
(Frunza et al. 2010). This heightened activity was due to so-called "carousel
fraud". The fraud involves criminals buying permits free from VAT in one EU
country, and then selling them in another country with VAT added but without
paying the VAT to the relevant country tax authority. Europol estimated the
total cost of the VAT fraud to be around e50 billion (Frunza et al. 2010).
"Phishing attacks" constitute another form of fraud a⁄ecting the market,
the ￿rst occurring in early February 2009. The ￿rst attack saw an estimated
250,000 permits with a value of over e3 million stolen by criminals setting up
fake registries. The attack involved six German companies giving their regis-
tration details away. It led to the temporary shut down of the trading system
on February 2nd (BBC 2010). A second attack in early January 2011 led to
the theft of e28 million from national registries in Austria, Greece, the Czech
Republic, Poland and Estonia. As a consequence, spot trading was shut down
in all national registries for several days (New York Times 2011).
Due to the need to ensure that increasingly stringent emissions targets and
ensure a high and stable price for carbon, the EC has implemented a number of
changes for Phase 3 (2013-2018). These measures include: a lengthening of the
compliance phase to 8 years (2013-2020) and an end to national allocation plans
for individual member states. These plans will be replaced by a centralized EU-
wide cap on emissions, which will include all greenhouse gases and all sectors.
This cap is designed to eliminate the biases of the previous system, wherein
10For the world as whole, issuances of CERs fell to 132 million tons in 2009, 10% less than
in 2008. In the ￿rst quarter of 2010, only 10 million CERs had been issued. The EU ETS
will no doubt be a⁄ected by this shortage. Forecasts suggest that demand for the certi￿cates
is expected to fall by 1 billion tonnes by 2012 (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010).
6member states favoured their own industries. The cap for 2013 will be based on
the average total quantity of allowances in Phase 2 and then a reduction factor
of 1.74% will be applied linearly each subsequent year. In Phase 3 there will
also be an increase in the number of permits auctioned to a minimum of 50%
(with 100% auctioning in the power sector in most of the EU). As mentioned,
the use of o⁄sets is likely to be severely restricted. These and other measures
are expected to lead to a 21% reduction below 2005 veri￿ed emissions by 2020.11
If an international agreement on climate change is reached post-Kyoto, the cap
will be tightened at 30% below 1990 levels.
At the beginning of 2011, uncertainty casts a shadow over the EU ETS mar-
ket. Economic recovery remains fragile in Europe and the euro is under threat.
Several carbon schemes in other parts of the world have ￿ oundered and the
Copenhagen and Cancun climate conferences have failed to reach a global agree-
ment on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Regulatory uncertainty surrounds
how CERs and ERUs will be credited in the next phase and what quantitative
limits will be placed on their use. It is also uncertain which CERs will be trad-
able (i.e. whether HFC projects are banned). Uncertainty also surrounds the
impact on the carbon market of the EU￿ s renewable energy targets, which have
been set at 20% of total energy use by 2020.12
2.2 Empirical Studies of Price Drivers in the EU ETS
Market
The previous sub-section discussed political and institutional issues that have
in￿ uenced the carbon market. The general picture is one of change, as poli-
cymakers ￿ne-tune the rules of the game so as to improve the system, and as
various outside pressures (e.g. fraud) in￿ uence the markets. We now turn to
a discussion of how the existing literature has attempted to statistically model
this changing and turbulent market.
An important focus of existing studies is the role of energy markets and
associated events (e.g. weather) in in￿ uencing carbon prices. Since industrial
and power sectors have received more than 50% of EUAs, this focus is under-
standable, as their behaviour largely determines demand (and thus prices) on
11The allocation of allowances to individual sectors will depend on benchmarks based on
the average of the top 10% most CO2 e¢ cient installations in the EU. The problem of carbon
leakage (i.e. industries relocating to countries outside the EU so as to avoid reducing carbon
emissions) will be addressed by giving sectors with a signi￿cant risk of locating overseas 100%
of the benchmarked allocation for free. Those less likely to move will receive 80% of their
benchmarked allocation for free in 2013, which will fall to 30% in 2020 and 0% in 2027.
The 300 million allowances from the new entrants reserve of the EU ETS will support the
demonstration of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and innovative renewable technologies.
12In their 5th survey of participant sentiment in the GHG market, the International Emis-
sions Trading Association (IETA) found that 2/3rds of respondents believed that current
uncertainties will have a signi￿cant negative impact on long-term low-carbon investment.
Con￿dence in the EU-ETS and the CDM was also down on the previous year￿ s survey. One-
half of respondents predicted that CERs will no longer be the dominant international o⁄set
by 2015.
7the market.
The energy switching behaviour of power operators is of particular interest,
which depends on the options available to them. Speci￿cally, power installations
in the EU generate electric power largely using natural gas and coal. To meet
their emission limits operators have a number of options: They can reduce the
amount of electricity they produce, but this rarely happens. They can move
toward low-carbon installations, which is the explicit aim of the EU ETS, but
hardly a short-term option. Only when the price of carbon rises high enough to
replace coal-￿red generation with low carbon alternatives will this be an option.
Consequently, in the short-term, the usual option open to generators is to take
advantage of the abatement opportunities provided by switching from coal to
gas-￿red generation. Coal tends to be cheaper than gas but it also emits more
than twice the CO2 emissions per mwh of electricity produced. Operators will
tend to consider the di⁄erence in relative pro￿ts from electricity generation using
coal and gas. Simply by switching to gas, they can achieve some abatement of
their CO2 emissions, and as a consequence, will require fewer permits. Economic
theory states that in equilibrium, the price of a permit should equal the marginal
cost of abatement. In the short-term, abatement will be based on switching from
coal to gas. Thus the marginal abatement cost should depend on the di⁄erence
between the price of gas and the price of coal. If gas prices rise, the marginal
abatement cost will also rise and thus the price of a permit should as well.
However, if coal prices rise such that coal generation is only a bit cheaper than
gas generation, marginal abatement costs will fall, as will the price of a permit.
In short, the price of coal and gas are important factors in driving carbon
prices, through the ability of producers to engage in fuel switching behaviour
(Christiansen et al. 2005; Chevallier 2009).
Empirical studies have indeed found associations between energy prices and
the price of carbon. Keppler and Mansanent-Batallet (2009) demonstrate that
during Phase 1, coal and gas prices, through clean dark and clean spark spreads13,
impacted on CO2 future prices. Similarly, Alberola et al. (2008b), Hintermann
(2010) ￿nd that high gas prices are associated with higher carbon permit prices.
They also ￿nd that, in a regression seeking to explain the carbon price, coal
prices and the clean dark spread are signi￿cant and of the expected negative
sign.
Bunn and Fezzi (2007) ￿nd the carbon price reacts quickly to the gas price.
Kanen (2006), Convery and Redmond (2007) and Mansanet-Batallet et al.
(2010) also ￿nd that energy price changes are signi￿cantly related to carbon
prices, with increases in the price of oil (which prices of natural gas are closely
tied to) having the most substantial e⁄ect.
Energy demand is also in￿ uenced by weather conditions. For instance, ex-
tremes of temperature in either direction (i.e. cold winters or hot summers)
could lead to unexpectedly high demand for energy. This would cause emissions
13These spreads are the margin a plant makes from selling a unit of electricity, having
bought the required fuel and carbon permits. The dark spread refers to coal and the spark
spread to gas. The key point to note is that they heavily re￿ect the price of coal or gas,
respectively.
8to rise and thus a⁄ect the price of a carbon permit. Mansanet-Batallet et al.
(2010) use as explanatory variables EU wide fuel prices and a weather index of
several cities in the ￿rst year of the carbon market and ￿nd that the temperature
in Germany is the only signi￿cant driver of carbon permit prices. Hintermann
(2010) ￿nds that temperatures a⁄ect the price of carbon more signi￿cantly in
the 2006 post-crash period in permit prices. Nordic reservoir levels and precip-
itation in Nordic countries (a proxy for reservoir levels in these areas) are also
found to be negative and signi￿cantly related to carbon prices. However, their
e⁄ect is diminishing, which re￿ ects the fact that reservoir capacity is limited as
is the amount of rainfall captured. Alberola et al. (2008b) focus their weather
analysis on extreme weather events, i.e. hot summers and cold winters in 4
countries (Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain), weighted by the share of
each country￿ s NAP. The authors ￿nd that unanticipated extremely cold (but
not hot) weather events are signi￿cantly and positively related to changes in
carbon prices.
Other market fundamentals, such as macroeconomic and industrial mea-
sures, have been found to be empirically associated with carbon prices. Cheva-
lier (2009) examines the role of commonly examined macroeconomic drivers
in driving futures price volatility (i.e. equity dividend yields, the junk bond
premium, the US Treasury bills, and the excess return on a global commodity
index). The author ￿nds that macroeconomic factors,with the exception of the
default yield spread in the bond market and the dividend yield in the equity
market, explain only some of the variance in carbon prices and only at cer-
tain points in time. Bredin and Muckley (2010) measure the impact on carbon
futures of equity prices and an index of industrial production. Both of these
variables are signi￿cant in the two phases, although industrial production was
found to have a counter-intuitively negative sign.
Examining the role of sectoral output in the combustion, paper and iron
sectors in large allowance-holding countries (France, Germany, Italy, Poland
the UK), Alberola et al. (2009a) ￿nd that output in the combustion sector
in countries (except in France and Italy) signi￿cantly impacted on EUA price
changes in Phase 1. But, the coe¢ cient on output in the iron sector had a
negative sign, which could be explained by the net long position of this sector
(i.e. too many permits were allocated to this sector). A variable controlling for
a structural break from 25 April to 23 June 2006, when prices plunged on the
announcement that many countries were over allocated permits, was signi￿cant
for all countries with the exception of Germany. The authors attribute the latter
￿nding to the net long position of this country￿ s sector in this period. Alberola
et al. (2008a) also ￿nd that only production in combustion and iron sectors in
the EU 24 were signi￿cant explanatory variables in regressions involving EUA
price changes in Phase 1.
In addition to the above market fundamentals, institutional features and
events have been modelled for their potential role in a⁄ecting the price of carbon.
Typically, these features are measured by the use of dummy variables. We will
discuss such dummy variables in the next section.
93 Data
3.1 General Discussion of Properties of the Data
Our dependent variables are based on the spot and future prices of a carbon
permit. The future has settlement date at the end of 2012 (i.e. this is the futures
contract with settlement at the most distant period available in our data set).
Our daily data set runs from 22 April, 2005 through 18 August, 2010.
Most empirical studies of the carbon market use either the spot price or
the futures price. As we shall discuss below, both prices are of interest. They
shed light on di⁄erent features of the carbon market (e.g. futures will have a
tendency to re￿ ect long-run expectations about the state of the carbon market,
whereas spot prices are potentially more sensitive to price drivers which have
a short-run impact) and have di⁄erent statistical properties. For these reasons,
our study uses both.
Figure 1 plots the spot and future prices of a carbon permit. Two important
aspects of the spot price series can immediately be seen. The ￿rst is evident in
the middle of 2006, when the spot price dropped dramatically from roughly e30
to e10. This occurred in response to the ￿rst release of emissions accounting
data for the EU ETS. This emissions veri￿cation showed that too many permits
had been released in the sense that actual emissions in 2005 were well below the
number of allocated permits. Subsequent to the price collapse in April 2006,
a brief stabilization of the price took place until late 2006. But by early 2007
the spot price had fallen again to less than e1, with a carbon permit becoming
virtually worthless (10 euro cents or less) by mid 2007.
The second feature is the sudden jump in the spot price, which occurs at the
beginning of 2008, when Phase 1 of the EU ETS ended and Phase 2 began. This
rapid jump in price occurred with the switch from worthless Phase 1 permits to
Phase 2 permits. Recall that EU ETS carbon permits from Phase 1 could not
be banked for use in Phase 2. Thus, formally speaking, in the case of the spot
price the product being bought is a Phase 1 carbon permit for use in 2005-2007
and in Phase 2, a carbon permit for use in 2008-2012. For our futures price
series the product being bought is always a Phase 2 carbon permit.
In order to address some of these data features, various statistical procedures
are used in the literature. Some papers carry out statistical tests for structural
breaks (e.g. Chevalier 2009), use estimation methods designed to be robust to
structural breaks, work with sub-samples of the data, or use other methods.
As described above, others use knowledge of institutional detail of the sort
described in Section 2.1 to create dummy variables. For instance, Hintermann
(2010) uses an ￿emissions veri￿cation dummy￿which equals one on 25-28 April
of each year (which is the time early information was released in 2006 about the
previous year￿ s emissions). Alberola et al. (2009b) and Chevalier (2009) use a
dummy variable for the entire period, 25 April through 26 July, 2006. Alberola
et al. (2009b) additionally use a dummy variable for 30 March through 30 April
of each year (a period which includes the yearly veri￿cation announcements).
Alberola et al. (2008b) include dummy variables for April 2006 and also for
10the period after October 2006 when a second slump in the carbon price occurs.
Frunza et al. (2010) argues that the carousel fraud described in Section 2.1
had a substantial impact on carbon prices and speci￿es the period 1 November,
2008 through 31 August, 2009 as the time period the fraudsters were active,
using a dummy variable for this period. Similarly, Mansanet-Bataller et al.
(2010) use a dummy variable for the credit crisis (covering the period 17 August,
2007 through 31 March, 2009) and four dummy variables that relate to news
that could impact on the carbon market concerning the release of information
about National Allocation Plans in Phase 2, developments in the EU ETS plans
relating to Phase 3, and the meetings of various executive boards and other
groups for making plans relating to the CER market and the linking of emission
trading schemes worldwide. In short, a myriad of di⁄erent dummy variables
have been used by di⁄erent authors.
Figure 1
Does the EU ETS provide a suitable market for forecasting or addressing im-
portant questions of interest (e.g. what are the price drivers for carbon prices?)?
As discussed in Section 2.1, strong evidence exists of repeated structural change
in the EU ETS carbon market due to its various institutional features. For
instance, it is possible that the carousel fraud problem in May/June 2009 or the
price collapse in late 2006 that carried through to 2007 caused by the overal-
location of permits make these periods so di⁄erent from each other (and from
other times) that it is meaningless to attempt a statistical analysis which in-
cludes them all. That is, it is possible that these factors completely explain
11the time series dynamics in these periods and that there is no role for the price
drivers to play. It also may be the case that Phase 1 and Phase 2 are so di⁄erent
from one another that it is meaningless to pool them both together into a single
statistical analysis. But we would expect this not to be the case. Even though
institutional details and unique aspects of the carbon market undoubtedly play
an important role in carbon pricing, it is likely that the price drivers discussed
in Section 2.1 as related to persistent market fundamentals, also play a role,
even though their e⁄ects may be weakened or masked by institutional features
and events. The challenge, taken up in this paper, is to devise a statistical
methodology that can deal with this and the other issues raised above.
The existing literature exhibits a belief that it is possible to answer impor-
tant ￿nancial questions with carbon market data and attempts to address the
issues noted above in various ways. One strategy in the literature is to work
with futures instead of spot price data. From Figure 1, it can be seen that the
futures price exhibits fewer of the pathologies that occur with the spot price.
For instance, Bredin and Muckley (2010) use futures data and document the
emergence of a stable market where prices are driven by fundamentals. How-
ever, the price of futures is not exactly the same as the spot price. Indeed
several ￿nancial theories involve investigation of the relationship between spot
and futures exchange rates. The price of a future re￿ ects investors￿beliefs about
the price of a carbon permit at the settlement date. The further into the future
the settlement date is, the more futures and spot price dynamics might di⁄er.
The future in Figure 1 has a settlement date of December 2012. The future
price with yearly settlement dates (i.e. in each year the price is for the future
with settlement in December of that year) yields a time series which is virtually
the same as the spot price series. Thus, the future with yearly settlement ex-
hibits all the pathologies of the spot price in Figure 1. It is only by considering
settlement dates in the more distant future that we can remove these patholo-
gies. But futures with such distant settlement dates can have a very di⁄erent
interpretation than the spot price.
As discussed, another strategy is to use dummy variables to control for insti-
tutional features. In the context of a forecasting exercise, a major problem with
such an approach is that often these dummy variables are selected in retrospect.
For instance, a forecaster in early April 2006 would probably not have known
to include a dummy variable in late April. Even if she had, she would not
have known its coe¢ cient. Thus, forecasts cannot be based on dummy variables
chosen in retrospect.
A second problem is that this strategy may not be su¢ cient. That is, the
inclusion of dummy variables allows for the intercept of a regression to shift,
but not the marginal e⁄ects of the price drivers.14 In our case, it is plausible
that the marginal e⁄ects will also change in response to the factors noted above.
A third problem is that there are so many potential dummy variables, and the
researcher has a degree of discretion in de￿ning them. Consider for instance,
14Unless dummies are interacted with the price drivers. However, this strategy can lead to
a proliferation of explanatory variables.
12the emissions veri￿cation dummy commonly used in these studies to handle
the institutional feature that, in late April of each year, an announcement is
made about the actual emissions of the previous year. As noted above, some
authors use a dummy variable for the period 25-28 April, while others use a
dummy for the more extended time period from 30 March through 30 April.
Some authors use such a dummy variable only for a period in 2006, but others
include the emissions veri￿cation dummy variable each year (note that the latter
may be inappropriate since the change in price on 25-28 April, 2006 is much
larger than for other years). To handle the long price decline after the emissions
veri￿cation of April 2006, some authors include a dummy variable for the entire
period (25 April through 26 July, 2006), while others do not. Some authors
include an additional dummy variable for the period around October 2006 when
the second slump in the carbon price occurred. Similar uncertainties over the
precise number and timing of dummy variables hold for other features of the
data.
Thus, the existing literature does not have a systematic way of handling the
changes that undoubtedly occur with this data set. It is common practice for
the researcher to observe an odd pattern in the data and then to think of a story
to justify that pattern. The trouble is that there are so many possible "stories".
Consider for instance the story told about the decline in spot prices between
April 2006 and the end of 2007. As we have seen, this decline is attributed
to the fact that, in April 2006, the emissions veri￿cation process showed that
the allocation of carbon permits was well above actual emissions in 2005. This
undoubtedly does account for a large part of the patterns in the spot price.
However, it does not explain other things (e.g. why the carbon permit price
stabilized in the latter half of 2006).
Figure 2 plots allocated and actual veri￿ed emissions in each year. The over-
allocation of permits in 2005 can clearly be seen. However, in other years, such
as 2008 an under-allocation occurs (probably due to the increasing use of carbon
o⁄sets). But in 2009 there was an over-allocation of permits of the same order of
magnitude as in 2005, but this did not cause a similar collapse in prices. All in
all, great care must be taken in the story-telling used to create dummy variables
in order to come up with sensible and consistent choices for such dummies.
13Figure 2
Recall that, in Phase 2, ￿rms were able to use carbon o⁄sets (instead of
carbon permits) to partially cover their CO2 emissions. For Phase 2, Figure
3 plots the CER futures price and the carbon permit futures price, both with
a settlement data at the end of 2012. An examination of this graph suggests
that, even though EU ￿rms can only partially cover their CO2 emissions by
using carbon o⁄sets, the two markets are clearly closely related to one another.
This raises the question of whether the set of price drivers for an EU ETS
carbon permit may be di⁄erent in Phase 2 than Phase 1. That is, the price
drivers in Phase 1 might re￿ ect European considerations, whereas Phase 2 price
drivers could be those a⁄ecting both the international CER market and the EU
ETS market. For instance, unusually hot summers which increase electricity
demand would increase the demand for carbon permits in Phase 1 and Phase
2. But in Phase 2 this driver might have less of an e⁄ect on the EU ETS
price since ￿rms could choose to buy carbon o⁄sets on the CER market, which
(since it is a world-wide market) would be less a⁄ected by an unusually hot
European summer. This institutional change provides a further justi￿cation for
a statistical methodology that allows for the marginal e⁄ects of price drivers on
the carbon price to change over time.
14Figure 3
Another approach used by some papers for surmounting such data problems
is to use only data for Phase 1 or Phase 2 (although papers such as Bredin and
Muckley 2010, do use data that span both phases). However, the restriction of
the analysis to one phase omits potentially useful information in both phases
about ￿nancial and other features of interest, such as the role of the price
drivers. Hence a more accurate estimation of such features of interest will be
obtained from using all the data. However, it is important to use a statistical
methodology that allows for parameters and models to change across phases.
3.2 Data Description
Before turning to our statistical methodology, we specify and justify our set
of potential explanatory variables (or ￿price drivers￿ ). These are chosen as
covering a wide range of issues and have all been used before in the literature (see
Section 2.2). For future reference, it is worth noting that this list of predictors
is quite a long one, raising statistical concerns about over-￿tting. A summary
of data sources and acronyms is available in Appendix A.
a) Dependent variables:
The daily spot price of carbon permits (EUA) is taken from the Bluenext
and Powernext exchanges. Data from the Bluenext Exchange, one of the most
liquid spot market, was unavailable for the early months of 2005; hence we
supplement the daily data for this period with data from the Powernext spot
exchange. Measured in euros/tonne.
15Daily futures price of carbon permit (EUA) for settlement on December
2012, the furthest date ahead for which we had complete data for both phases.
As with the spot price, this variable is measured in euros/tonne of CO2.
b) Explanatory variables:
We use the following independent variables re￿ ecting a wide range of macro-
economic/￿nancial and institutional variables (acronyms in brackets):
￿ Oil price (poil). Daily futures (month) ahead price of oil (brent in eu-
ros/barrel) from the Intercontinental Commodities Exchange (ICE). There
is evidence to suggest that natural gas price movements in Europe are
linked to those for crude oil (e.g. Asche et al. 2006 and Josse-Vasquez
and Neumann 2006)
￿ Coal price (pcoal). McCloskey NW Europe Steam Coal marker.15
￿ Gas price (pgas). Measured as the Netherlands TTF day ahead conti-
nental gas futures negotiated in one of Europe￿ s largest exchanges, APX-
ENDEX. Measured in euros/mwh.16
￿ Electricity price (pel). Measured as the Phelix base load daily one month
ahead price of electricity negotiated on the European Energy exchange in
euros/mwh.
￿ Temperature (tempdev). The temperature of each EU country was cal-
culated17 and a weighted average across countries was taken (weights were
proportional to population). The absolute value of the deviation from this
mean temperature was calculated (see Bredin and Muckley 2010). Data
were from the European Climate Assessment Dataset (Klein Tank et al.
2010). Note that carbon permit spot prices are expected to be most sen-
sitive to unexpected increases in demand for electricity or oil. Such un-
expected increases should be associated with unusually hot or cold days.
Hence, the use of an absolute deviation from mean.
￿ Availability of hydropower energy variables (resprop) and (precip). The
￿rst of these variables was constructed from data from the Noordpool ex-
change which consists of the main hydropower producers in Europe (Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark and Finland). It was constructed by taking weekly
reservoir capacity in the three countries and dividing by the total maxi-
mum possible. It was obtained from the Noordpool exchange. Reservoir
capacity will a⁄ect the supply of hydroelectric power as will precipitation
15An alternative measure, which has been used in a number of studies (e.g. Alberola et
al. 2009b), is the daily coal month ahead futures price. However, this variable is not as
comprehensive in scope as the McCloskey marker as values are missing for one-third of the
beginning of the time period under investigation
16This data set is more comprehensive than the commonly used alternative Zeebrugee day
ahead measures for UK gas, which has missing data for 2005.
17A few small countries with patchy data were omitted.
16(Hintermann 2010). Consequently, the second variable is the precipita-
tion level in two Noordpool countries for which complete daily data were
available, Sweden and Finland .
￿ Stock price (pstock). Daily index of the stock prices of the most highly
capitalized, 100 blue-chip companies in Europe (the Euronext 100). This
variable is a proxy for performance of the ￿nancial markets in the EU. It
was derived from Thompson Datastream.
￿ Commodity price (pcomm). Daily index of world commodity prices (in-
cluding energy). The Reuters commodity index measures the price of basic
inputs into the European economy; these, in turn, will have an impact on
the costs of production for installations and thus the demand for permits.
This measure was derived from Thompson Datastream.
￿ Corporate risk premium variable (junkprem). The risk premium is an
important component in the assessment of the value of corporate invest-
ments. A commonly used measure is the junk bond premium, calculated
in this study as the di⁄erence between Moody￿ s BAA and AAA-rated
bonds. The higher the spread, the greater the credit risk. Other macro-
economic studies have included some interest rate measure as well, to
indicate investment risk, information which would be incorporated in the
above measure, which re￿ ects this risk more directly.
￿ Carbon prices in the US (pcarbus). Daily carbon permit prices on the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). A voluntary carbon market in the US,
the commodity traded is the CFI (carbon ￿nance instrument). Partici-
pants voluntary agree to a legally binding commitment to cut emissions.
The CCX is the largest carbon exchange in the US, and thus has the
potential to a⁄ect the size of the market, if a comprehensive mandatory
cap-and-trade legislation were ever to be passed. In the absence of manda-
tory legislation for now, a strong voluntary market in the US (strengthened
by anticipation among traders of new mandatory legislation) may send a
bullish signal to compliance markets elsewhere. The variable is measured
in US dollars per metric tonne of carbon.
￿ Carbon o⁄set price (CERfuture). We use the daily price of CER futures
since 2008. We use the futures data rather than spot data on CERs
since the latter has incomplete coverage. It is derived from the European
Climate Exchange (ECX) and is measured as the daily CER futures price
in euros with settlement in December 2012.
￿ Dummy controlling for the two phases (dumphase1): Equals 1 during
Phase 1 and 0 during Phase 2.
￿ Overallocation of permits measure (overalloc). This variable is con-
structed by subtracting allocated permits from actual emissions each year.
174 Statistical Methods
In this paper we are interested in forecasting the European carbon market. This
interest derives partly because developing statistical methods for forecasting in
such markets is of interest in and of itself (e.g. for investors in the market).
But it is also important for the private sector to accurately assess future costs
and plan necessary changes in production. Likewise, policymakers need such
information to guide them in the setting of e¢ cient emissions limits and for
measuring the social costs of carbon-emission reduction. The pseudo real-time
nature of a forecasting exercise allows us to see if there are times when more
accurate forecasting is possible. In addition, a forecasting exercise is an excellent
way of answering questions of the type: ￿What are the price drivers for the
carbon market?￿"Are these price drivers changing over time?￿ . A forecasting
exercise is less likely to su⁄er from over-￿tting problems (i.e. a model with many
potential price drivers could over-￿t in-sample, with the over-￿tting problem
revealed in poor out-of-sample forecast performance).
The considerations of the previous sections mean that we want a statistical
methodology that:
1. Is an extension of a regression model where a dependent variable (e.g. the
price of a carbon permit) depends on a large set of explanatory variables.
2. Allows for the forecasting model to change over time.
3. Allows for the marginal e⁄ects of the regression model to change over time.
4. Avoids problems with over-￿tting that can occur when the number of
explanatory variables is large.
5. Allows for changes in volatility (which is an important consideration for
any analysis involving daily ￿nancial data).
In this paper, we use a statistical methodology called DMA, developed in
Raftery et al. (2010), which satis￿es these characteristics. The reader is referred
to Raftery et al. (2010) for complete details of DMA. Here we outline only the
basic ideas, with some additional technical details provided in Appendix B.
To explain DMA, we begin with the time-varying parameter (TVP) regres-
sion model:
yt = Zt￿1￿t + "t (1)
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿t;
where yt is the dependent variable (e.g. the price of a carbon permit), Zt￿1
is a 1 ￿ m vector of observations on explanatory variables that are used for
forecasting yt, ￿t is an m ￿ 1 vector of regression coe¢ cients, "t is N (0;Ht)
and ￿t is N (0;Qt). Note that we are forecasting one day ahead and, thus,
Zt￿1 is the information available for forecasting yt (and in our empirical work,
18our price drivers will always be lagged one day). The TVP regression model
is a state space model of the sort commonly used in empirical macroeconomics
(see, e.g., among many others, Cogley and Sargent 2005; Cogley, Morozov and
Sargent 2005; Primiceri 2005).18 Standard methods (e.g. involving the Kalman
￿lter) for estimation and prediction exist with such models. They allow for the
marginal e⁄ects of the predictors to change over time. This is potentially very
useful with the present data set. For instance, if the gradual decline of the
carbon permit price in late 2006 was associated with a gradual change in the
role of some of the price drivers, then a TVP regression model would be an ideal
way of modelling this.
However, TVP regression models can deal poorly with the sort of abrupt
changes in the time series dynamics that we may expect with this data set. Fur-
thermore, they can be over-parameterized. That is, if m is moderately large (as
in the present application) and the data are noisy, even a standard regression
model can over-￿t. In regression problems with many potential explanatory vari-
ables, Bayesian model averaging (BMA) has been a common response to such
worries (see, among many others, Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting, 1997, Fernan-
dez, Ley and Steel 2001a,b; Eicher, Papageorgiou and Raftery 2010 and Ley and
Steel 2010). However, until very recently, it has been considered computation-
ally infeasible to do BMA with TVP regressions such as (1). The contribution
of Raftery et al. (2010) was to develop computationally feasible methods of do-
ing model averaging with dynamic models such as (1). The resulting statistical
methods are called DMA. The empirical work in Raftery et al. (2010) involves
an engineering application, but Koop and Korobilis (2010) ￿nd DMA to work
well in a macroeconomic application.
To de￿ne the set of models used in DMA, let Z
(k)
t contain a subset of of the
price drivers in Zt for k = 1;::;K. Since Zt contains m price drivers and there
































. Let Lt 2 f1;2;::;Kg denote which
model applies at each time period and yt = (y1;::;yt)
0.19 The fact that we are
18Note that some of the carbon market literature uses cointegration methods. However,
this is unnecessary here. When working with TVP models, researchers typically do not worry
about unit root or cointegration issues. TVP models are very ￿exible and their focus is on
￿tting the time variation in coe¢ cients. Even if variables have unit roots this is not a problem
in the sense that all that matters is that "t and ut do not have unit roots. The time-varying
￿t can e⁄ectively pick out cointegrating relationships (if they exist) leading to stationary
residuals. Even if they fail to do so, note that the presence of a time-varying intercept which
follows a random walk will pick up any remaining nonstationarity in the model.
19For notational simplicitly, we do not explicitly include Zt￿1 in the conditioning argument
in the densities below (but all densities are conditional on the price drivers).
19letting di⁄erent models hold at each point in time and will carry out model aver-
aging justi￿es the terminology ￿dynamic model averaging￿ . To be precise, DMA
involves estimating ￿
(k)
t in each individual model and averaging these model-
speci￿c estimates across the model space using Pr
￿
Lt = kjyt￿1￿
for k = 1;::;K
as weights. When forecasting, DMA involves averaging across predictive densi-
ties or point forecasts using Pr
￿
Lt = kjyt￿1￿
for k = 1;::;K as weights. Since
standard Kalman ￿ltering methods provide us with the predictive density in




. Raftery et al. (2010) develops computationally e¢ cient
methods for this calculation.
The advantage of DMA is that it allows for switches between parsimonious
models. That is, instead of su⁄ering the over-￿tting problems that often occur
with TVP regression models that include all m price drivers at each point in time
(or su⁄ering from misspeci￿cation problems that arise if constant coe¢ cients
models or models with too few price drivers are used), DMA can switch from
(say) a TVP model with three or four price drivers to a TVP model with three
or four di⁄erent price drivers. In practice (see, e.g., Koop and Korobilis 2010)
DMA has been found to favour parsimonious models and can handle abrupt
changes in the dynamic structure (such as might have happened when Phase 1
ended and Phase 2 begins) much better than conventional TVP models.
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it to note here that both of these will vary over time in our application. With
￿nancial data, it is especially important that H
(k)
t be allowed to vary over time to
capture the changes and clustering of volatility that characterize ￿nancial time
series. We use an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) estimate
of H
(k)
t commonly used with ￿nancial time series (see, e.g., Riskmetrics 1996).
Further details on our implementation of DMA are given in Appendix B.
Raftery et al. (2010) provides complete details and derivations. Note, in partic-
ular, that DMA involves the choice of two so-called forgetting factors, ￿ and ￿,
which in￿ uence the rate of change in coe¢ cients and models, respectively. These
forgetting factors are set to ￿ = ￿ = 0:99 which are the choices recommended
by Raftery et al. (2010).
5 Forecasting Carbon Prices in the EU ETS
5.1 Introduction
All the explanatory variables in our models are lagged by one day relative to
the dependent variable. All of the models include an intercept, a lag of the
dependent variable and a dummy variable which equals 1 for Phase 1. Our
models di⁄er in their treatment of the 13 price drivers given in Section 3.2.
Thus, at each point in time, DMA is model averaging over K = 213 = 8192
models (and the weights in the model averaging process are changing over time).
We divide our results in two parts: one applies to estimation using DMA;
the other to forecasting. All variables are logged except for those which take on
20zero or negative values. We repeat all our empirical work twice: once using the
log of the spot price as the dependent variable, the other using the log of the
futures price as the dependent variable.
5.2 Price Drivers
Figures 4 through 9 summarize the information provided by our many models
and parameters when the log of the carbon future is the dependent variable.
Figure 4 sheds light on how parsimonious DMA is. Let Size(k) be the number








can be interpreted as the expected or average number of price drivers used in
DMA at time t. Figures 5 through 8 present the inclusion probabilities for each
variable (i.e. they are the weight used by DMA attached to models that include
a particular price driver). Figure 9 plots the estimate of the error variance, Ht.
In general, Figures 4 through 8 show that, even with the carbon futures data
(which does not have the same pathologies as the spot price data, see Figure
1), constant coe¢ cient models that simply include all the price drivers are inap-
propriate. Figure 4 indicates that although 13 price drivers are available, DMA
chooses to forecast with models with roughly half of them omitted. Figures 5
through 8 demonstrate that there is a great deal of variation over time in re-
spect to which price drivers are included. And Figure 9 exhibits a great deal of
time-variation in volatility.
With regard to Figures 5 through 8, we hesitate to tell strong stories about
individual price drivers in the context of a reduced-form forecasting exercise
such as the present one. Nevertheless, a few patterns are worth noting. It
is rare for DMA to attach a probability close to one to any particular price
driver at any point in time. This is to be expected with a ￿nancial forecasting
exercise (where often the ￿rst lag of the dependent variable provides most of
the predictive power) with correlated explanatory variables. As with previous
studies, though, the prices of gas, oil, coal and electricity are often important
price drivers. Note, in particular, the increasing role of natural gas prices in
2009.
In terms of ￿nancial variables, the junk bond premium (a measure of ￿nancial
risk) brie￿ y becomes very important at the height of the ￿nancial crisis in the
autumn of 2008. Figure 8 shows that the CER future variable is increasingly
an important price driver in Phase 2, while Figure 7 shows that the US carbon
market variable (pcarbus) is a moderately strong price driver over the whole
data span. Figure 9, which plots the error variance, shows a large increase in
volatility in two time periods we have discussed above. These are the periods
that correspond to the spring 2006 when the initial emissions veri￿cation process
revealed the over-allocation of permits; and early 2009, when fraudulent activity
a⁄ected the market (Frunza et al. 2010).
21Figure 4: Results for Carbon Futures Price
Figure 5: Results for Carbon Futures Price
22Figure 6: Results for Carbon Futures Price
Figure 7: Results for Carbon Futures Price
23Figure 8: Results for Carbon Futures Price
Figure 9: Results for Carbon Futures Price
24Figures 10 through 13 present the same information as Figures 4 through 7,
except that they use the log of the spot price instead of the log of the futures
price as the dependent variable. Broadly speaking, we ￿nd a similar pattern of
change in respect to price drivers and expected model size. However, there are
some di⁄erences that are worth noting. First of all, we have not presented results
for the CER future price driver analogous to Figure 8. The ￿gure is basically
a horizontal line at one. Thus, when the spot price is the dependent variable,
DMA always wants to include the lag of the CER future price as a predictor.
Remember that a lag of the spot price is also included in the model, so this
result says that the lag of the CER future is providing additional explanatory
power. Secondly, DMA is now choosing slightly less parsimonious models. A
careful examination of Figures 10 through 13 indicates that variables such as
the price of gas and tempdev (our measure of temperature extremes) have a
more important role in respect to the spot than the futures price. This is to
be expected since the spot price of a carbon permit is expected to re￿ ect short
term issues to a larger extent than a futures price with settlement date in 2012.
For instance, an unusually hot summer will increase demand for carbon permits
and thus a⁄ect the spot price. However an unusually hot summer will have less
impact on the futures price. Similarly, the price of gas is an important factor
bearing on the clean spark spread and, thus, on a ￿rm￿ s decision whether to
abate or buy carbon permits to cover emissions. Changes in the clean spark
price on a particular day will more likely impact the spot price than the futures
price.
Figure 10: Results for Carbon Spot Price Data
25Figure 11: Results for Carbon Spot Price Data
Figure 12: Results for Carbon Spot Price Data
26Figure 13: Results for Carbon Spot Price Data
5.3 Results of Forecasting Exercise
To evaluate the forecasting performance of DMA in the carbon market, we use
mean squared forecast errors (MSFEs) and sums of log predictive likelihoods.
The MSFE is a standard measure of the performance of point forecasts, whereas
the sum of log predictive likelihoods evaluates the forecast performance of the
entire predictive density. Formally, the predictive likelihood at time t is the
predictive density (given information through t￿1) evaluated at the actual out-
come. DMA provides us with the predictive density (see Appendix B). For both
MSFEs and sums of log predictive likelihoods we set aside an initial 100 daily
observations and evaluate forecast performance on the remaining observations.
We compare our DMA forecasts with three other forecasting procedures.
The ￿rst of these performs model averaging in the same manner as DMA, but
is not a TVP model. That is, in (1) it sets Qt = 0 so that coe¢ cients do
not change over time. The second is a TVP regression model including all the
price drivers. No model averaging is involved, but rather this single model is
used. The third is simply the single model which includes all the price drivers
and does not allow for time variation in coe¢ cients (i.e. it is analogous to a
recursive OLS forecasting strategy using a regression model containing all the
explanatory variables). Full details of all approaches are provided in Appendix
B.
Table 1 compares the forecast performance of these di⁄erent approaches.
27Since low values of MSFEs and high values of predictive likelihoods, respec-
tively, indicate good forecast performance, it can be seen that constant coef-
￿cient models always perform poorly. For the spot price data, which exhibits
the pathologies seen in Figure 1, this is unsurprising. However, such a ￿nding
is less expected in the futures market. Overall we ￿nd DMA to consistently
forecast well. However, in the spot market the TVP model also forecasts well
(at least in terms of MSFE) whereas in the futures market DMA without TVP
also performs well. DMA combines two aspects: it allows for parameters to
change and for models to change. In the spot market, the ￿rst of seems very
important; whereas in the futures market, the second is. Since in any empirical
￿nancial forecasting exercise either aspect could be important, the bene￿ts of
using DMA, which allows for both, are obvious.
Table 1: Forecasting Carbon Prices
Spot Futures
MSFE Pred. Like. MSFE Pred. Like
DMA 116.15 1707.87 0.95 2822.81
DMA (no TVP) 233.73 426.84 0.94 2838.36
TVP (no DMA) 114.78 1664.12 1.11 2754.59
Const. Coe⁄. 250.39 358.06 1.02 2792.73
To understand how the results in Table 1 arise, it is worth studying the
forecast performance over time in more detail. An important issue is how DMA
handled the abrupt break in the spot price when we switched from Phase 1
to Phase 2. When forecasting the spot price on 1 January, 2008, the real-
time forecaster only has information available through 31 December, 2007. The
inclusion of a dummy variable for Phase 2 will be of no immediate bene￿t since
on 31 December, 2007 there will be no data available to estimate its coe¢ cient.
On 31 December, 2007 the log of the spot price was -3.91, before switching to
3.18, 3.20, 3.20 and 3.21 on the ￿rst four trading days of January 2008. The
DMA point forecasts on these ￿ve days are -3.94, -4.11, 10.24, 3.27 and 3.20. In
other words, DMA (unsurprisingly) forecasts very poorly on the ￿rst two trading
days of January, but by the third day was forecasting reasonably well and by the
fourth and beyond was exhibiting very good forecast performance. We ￿nd this
strong evidence that DMA can e⁄ectively handle even large structural breaks in
￿nancial time series. That is, it only took DMA three or four days to adjust its
forecast performance to a break of huge magnitude in the dependent variable.
Table 1 contains sums of log predictive likelihoods over the entire sample.
Figures 14 and 15 plot cumulative sums up to each point in time labelled on
the X-axis for the futures and spot prices, respectively. A straight line in such
a graph indicates that forecast performance is of a constant quality throughout
the sample. For the futures data, apart from a small deterioration in forecast
performance in May 2006 (i.e. the time when prices declined after the initial
emissions veri￿cation revealed an over-allocation of permits), Figure 14 reveals
such a straight line. For the spot price data, a clear deterioration in forecast
performance is observed both in May 2006 and in early 2008 after the switch
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Figure 14: Results for Carbon Futures Price
5.4 Results Using only Phase 2 Data
Above, we have presented results using daily data from 22 April, 2005 through
18 August, 2010, which spans Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the EU ETS. We have
argued previously that, even for a ￿nancial market hat has exhibited changes in
its structure, it is best to include all the available data and use a method such
as DMA to model the changes in structure. However, many (but not all) the
papers in the literature use data from only one phase. Hence as a robustness
check, we present results using exactly the same methods as above, but only
using Phase 2 data. Table 2 presents results in the same format as Table 1. For
the spot prices, DMA exhibits clearly superior forecast performance to all other
methods. Thus, the superior forecast performance of DMA found in Table 1
was not due solely to its capability to handle the large break in spot prices that
occurred in the switch between Phase 1 and Phase 2. For futures prices, the
pattern of results is the same as in Table 1. DMA forecasts well, but the TVP
aspect of the model adds little (since DMA without TVP also forecasts well).
However, constant coe¢ cient models forecast poorly. As with Table 1, we are
￿nding strong evidence of the necessity of DMA (or a similar method which
allows for parameter and model change) in order to forecast well in the carbon
markets.
29Figure 1: Figure 15: Results for Carbon Spot Price Data
Table 2: Forecasting Phase 2 Carbon Prices
Spot Futures
MSFE Pred. Like. MSFE Pred. Like
DMA 0.44 1268.79 0.38 1309.59
DMA (no TVP) 0.55 1229.12 0.39 1312.54
TVP (no DMA) 0.65 1066.27 0.42 1195.88
Const. Coe⁄. 0.99 1010.36 0.42 1217.06
For the sake of brevity, we will not produce ￿gures comparable to Figure
4 through 15 based on Phase 2 data. Su¢ ce it to note here that the general
patterns are similar to those found using the entire sample: DMA does not
provide us with a simple story where one or two price drivers are playing a
predominant role. Rather the importance of the various price drivers is changing
over time. Most of the speci￿c patterns found using the entire sample are
retained in the Phase 2 sample. For instance, the gas price remains an important
price driver, particularly in the ￿rst half of 2009. At the time of the credit
crunch, in the autumn of 2008, the junk bond premium becomes an important
predictor. With regards to the error volatility, its increase in the ￿rst half of
2009 noted previously is replicated in the Phase 2 data.
305.5 Further Discussion of Results
The DMA methodology employed in this study has revealed a number of char-
acteristics pertinent to understanding the properties of the carbon futures and
spot markets. First, it does not seem to be the case that this market is operat-
ing e¢ ciently. By way of explanation, note that the e¢ cient markets hypothesis
states that the price of an asset should re￿ ect all available information about
market fundamentals. Price changes should only occur in response to new in-
formation about the asset￿ s fundamental value. In our study, the price drivers
should measure new information. We are ￿nding that the price drivers often
do have forecasting power. However, in stable, mature and e¢ cient markets,
we would expect the role of the price drivers to be roughly constant over time.
For example, in mature markets we might expect that every time the coal price
rises it will impact the carbon permit price in roughly the same way. We are
not ￿nding this stability in our results.
Furthermore, results for the spot and future prices exhibit similar levels of
instability. This is not what we would expect in mature markets. That is,
￿nancial theory suggests that futures (with settlement date December 2012)
should be less sensitive to news that has a short run impact on the demand
for carbon permits. However, we ￿nd, for example, that some of price drivers
re￿ ecting weather conditions (which would be expected to have most impact
on the current year￿ s demand for carbon permits) are important for the futures
price even in Phase 1. This instability in the EU ETS could have impacts on
emitters, making it more di¢ cult for them to plan ahead and achieve reductions
in CO2 emissions in a cost e⁄ective manner (e.g. through investments in low-
carbon technologies and optimal design of policies programs aimed at emissions
reduction). Nonetheless, we do see how a method like DMA can adapt the
forecasting model quite quickly over time to handle the instabilities in the carbon
market. Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 14 and 15 show DMA to forecast well, with
only brief deteriorations in forecast performance at the most turbulent times.
Second, while we hesitate to make any de￿nitive statements about price
drivers in a reduced form forecasting model with correlated explanatory vari-
ables, we also ￿nd that the importance of certain drivers switches over time: For
instance, as in previous studies we ￿nd prices of gas, oil coal and electricity are
important drivers that dominate the list of our variables, but that their predic-
tive power is not sustained over the course of the study. We also ￿nd that some
variables (e.g. the junk bond premium) gain particular importance suddenly,
albeit only brie￿ y, at the height of the ￿nancial crisis. The interpretation of the
importance of such a variable as a price driver is not as straightforward as with
conventional variables, such as temperature or energy. When global economic
conditions became unstable, investment risks will increase (as measured by the
premium demanded on risky bonds).Re￿ ecting this risk, we ￿nd that the latter
in turn impacted on the price of carbon. We also ￿nd the in￿ uence of carbon
o⁄sets on price to be very important. For the futures price, though, it is inter-
esting to note that its in￿ uence began to decline near the end of our sample.
This decline may have been due to a drop in issuance rates of CERs. Remember
31that the quantities of CERs requested by project developers from large scale,
high-yield CER projects began to fall when they came under increasing scrutiny
by the CDM.
The US voluntary carbon market variable (pcarbus) is a moderately strong
price driver over the whole data span of the study. On one level, this is to be
expected. Given the demand for emissions rights that US involvement in a global
mandatory cap-and-trade scheme would generate, the strength of the voluntary
market could be rightly taken to be a signal of the potential commitment of
US businesses to reduce carbon emissions. Its abrupt fall in in￿ uence as a price
driver for carbon futures in June 2009 may have re￿ ected the fact that the price
of a permit on the voluntary market plunged well below 60 cents. However,
despite prices falling to as low as 10 cents after this period, it regained some of
its status as a price driver, perhaps due to optimism over a long-awaited climate
bill that failed to pass in July 2010.
Our ￿nding that price drivers are switching over time suggests a market that
is still unstable and immature. This failure may be as much due to the scheme￿ s
institutional features and related events as it is to market fundamentals. As the
end of Phase 2 draws closer, a number of institutional issues continue to create
problems for the market. These include: the uncertainty over the use and
number of CER/JI o⁄sets and emission reduction goals, on-going fraud in the
marketplace, and the potential for carbon leakage of energy-intensive industries.
Regarding the latter, there is worry that some carbon intensive businesses will
not be able to pass on the cost of carbon to consumers or obtain su¢ cient
permits at home due to a restriction in o⁄sets and thus will move abroad.
All of these issues are likely to a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of the carbon market in a
number of ways: Uncertainty over caps and o⁄sets leads to price instability and
depresses investment in abatement and low carbon technologies. Moreover, the
restriction of international o⁄sets well below a supplementarity limit speci￿ed
by the Kyoto Protocol means that reductions will not be done in a cost-e⁄ective
way since the di⁄erences in marginal abatement costs between countries may no
longer be exploited. As well as leading to declining investments in developing
and emerging market countries, the restriction of o⁄sets and the lack of an
internationally binding global emissions reduction agreement means that it is
unlikely that a single, global price for carbon will be achieved in the near future.
This failure will continue to depress the EU ETS market price. Similarly, carbon
leakage will be exacerbated by the restriction in use of international o⁄sets,
especially in energy-intensive sectors, with negative consequences for carbon
markets. Finally, the EU￿ s mandatory target of a 20% share for renewable
energies by 2020 will be harder to achieve in the power industry, with restrictions
on such o⁄sets and no free allocations after 2012. Restrictions would be expected
to lead to a rise in the price of carbon price. Conversely, if the EC subsidizes and
provides other incentives for renewables, then the carbon price may actually fall
as a large amount of emission reductions will be achieved outside of the market.
326 Conclusion
This paper has used a technique called DMA to forecast spot and futures prices
in the EU ETS carbon market. Forecasting prices as accurately as possible is
necessary for installations subject to compliance to make appropriate investment
decisions based on long-term price expectations and for policymakers to design
appropriate emission reductions policies and calculate the real costs of emissions
reduction to society. We have argued that DMA is ideally suited for studying
such a market, since it deals with problems caused by the proliferation of price
drivers and allows for the changing e⁄ects of price drivers in the market and
for the forecasting model itself to change over time. We ￿nd strong evidence of
substantial turbulence and change in the EU ETS market. We show how our
DMA approach can model these features and forecast accurately compared to
other approaches. Finally, we ￿nd that the importance of price drivers in the
EU ETS is constantly changing, although several retain their importance longer
than do others.
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Variable Description Acronym Source Measure
Phase 1 & 2 Dummy dumphase1 ￿ 1=Phase1; 0=Phase 2
Emissions-to-cap overalloc EU
Total annual EU actual emissions
minus total annual EU allocated permits




NW Europe Coal Marker (average price
at ARA hub)
Gas price pgas APX-ENDEX TTF continental gas price




Absolute deviation from daily population
weighted mean temperature




















Spread between Moody￿ s
BAA and AAA bonds
US carbon market pcarbus CCX Price carbon permits, US$/tonne
Carbon o⁄set price CERfuture ECX Price CER permit, euros/tonne
We use data from 22 April, 2005 through 18 August, 2010.There are missing
values in the spot price of a permit from 1 January, 2008 through 25 February,
2008. The cause of this was a delay in issuing the Phase 2 permits.20 For
these time periods, we use the price of a future permit with closest settlement
date (i.e. yearly settlement dates). This procedure can be justi￿ed by noting
that, for periods when data on both the spot price and the future with yearly
settlement date are available, the correlation between them is 0.9995 and they
are virtually the same as one another.
Also note the following about the variable measuring overallocation of per-
mits: At each point in time, we take the most recent allocation and veri￿cation
of emissions that would be known at that point in time and subtract the lat-
ter from the former. Veri￿ed emissions data for the previous year is released
on 15 May. Thus, for example, on 14 May, 2007 the forecaster would only
have the 2005 overallocation data, but on 15 May, 2007 it becomes the 2006
overallocation data.
20This delay occurred because the EU￿ s CITL was not connected to the UN￿ s
International Transaction Log (ITL), which caused some governments to de-
lay issuance of new permits. For more explanation, see http://www.carbon-
￿nanceonline.com/index.cfm?section=lead&action=view&id=11081.
37Appendix B: Statistical Methodology (DMA)
We work with the set of models de￿ned in (2). Estimation within a single
model involves familiar statistical methods involving the Kalman ￿lter and will
not be explained here in detail. Su¢ ce it to note that (apart from our estimation
of H
(k)
t which will be discussed below), our estimation methods within a single
model are exactly as in Raftery et al. (2010). This involves the choice of a
forgetting factor, ￿, and we (following Raftery et al., 2010) set ￿ = 0:99: The
use of a forgetting factor implicitly estimates Qk
t. With regards to initialization
of the Kalman ￿lter, we use a di⁄use prior ￿
(k)
0 ￿ N (0;100Imk), where mk is
the number of variables in model k, for k = 1;::;K.
To simplify notation, let ￿tjs;k = Pr(Lt = kjys). The new recursions re-
quired by DMA involve (beginning with ￿0j0;k) ￿tjt￿1;k and ￿tjt;k. DMA pro-
ceeds by averaging across forecasts using ￿tjt￿1;k as weights for k = 1;::;K and














t￿1 is the Kalman ￿lter estimate of the regression coe¢ cients given
information available at time t ￿ 1.








where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 is a forgetting factor which is set to a ￿xed value slightly
less than one. The huge advantage of using the forgetting factor ￿ in the model
prediction equation is that we do not require an MCMC algorithm to draw tran-
sitions between models nor a simulation algorithm over model space. Instead,
simple evaluations comparable to those of the updating equation in the Kalman











is the predictive density for model l (i.e. this is the standard
Normal predictive density provided by the Kalman ￿lter) evaluated at yt.
To understand further how the forgetting factor ￿ can be interpreted, note
that this speci￿cation implies that the weight used in DMA which is attached















38Thus, model k will receive more weight at time t if it has forecast well in the




). The interpretation of ￿recent past￿is controlled by the forget-
ting factor, ￿ and we have an exponential decay at the rate ￿i for observations
i periods ago. Thus, if ￿ = 0:99 (the value used by Raftery et al., 2010),
forecast performance four weeks ago receives 80% as much weight as forecast
performance last period (when using daily data based on a ￿ve day week).
In our forecasting exercise, we compare DMA to several alternatives. These
are obtained as special cases of DMA. Our ￿rst comparator does model aver-
aging, but does not allow for time variation in parameters. This is obtained
by setting ￿ = 1, but all other assumptions are identical to those used with
DMA. The second comparator allows for time variation in parameters, but does
not do model averaging. Instead it simply works with a single model which
includes all of the explanatory variable. This is obtained by restricting the
DMA model space to this single model, but all other assumptions are as with
DMA. Our third comparator allows for no model averaging nor time variation
in parameters (beyond that associated with any recursive forecasting exercise).
It combines the assumptions of our ￿rst and second comparators (i.e. it works
with the same single model as the second, but sets ￿ = 1 as in the ￿rst).
We stress that, conditional on Ht, the estimation and forecasting strategy
outlined above only involves evaluating formulae such as those in the Kalman
￿lter. The recursions above are started by choosing ￿0j0;k for k = 1;::;K and
we make the noninformative choice of ￿0j0;k = 1
K for k = 1;::;K.
The preceding discussion is all conditional on Ht. Raftery et al. (2010)
recommend a simple plug in method where H
(k)
t = H(k) and is replaced with
a consistent estimate. When forecasting ￿nancial variables, however, it is likely
that the error variance is changing over time. Thus, we use an Exponentially



















EWMA estimators are commonly used to model time-varying volatilities in
￿nance; see Riskmetrics (1996) for the properties of EWMA estimators. ￿ is
called a decay factor, and Riskmetrics proposes setting 0.94 for daily data and
we follow this choice. An attractive feature of the EWMA speci￿cation is that it
can be approximated by a recursive form, which can be used to obtain volatility
forecasts. The period t + 1 forecast given data up to time t takes the form.
b H
(k)
t+1jt = ￿ b H
(k)
tjt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
yt ￿ Z
(k)
t b ￿
(k)
t
￿2
:
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